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AND THE CONCEPTION OF PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY

Abstract
The legal discourse on child protection that is characterized by the normalization\moralization paradigm focuses more on society’s response to parental failure than on the predicament of the child. To discuss this argument, the paper presents findings from legal discourse texts in Israel and in Holland. Both sets of texts portray an alliance between the respective legal systems and an epistemology of normality with regard to parenting, thereby turning normality into normalization. Both sets of texts are guided by ontology of moral judgement that protects societal morale rather than the child. Morality is turned into moralization. To focus on the protection of the child, the paper proposes a paradigm wherein the definition of morality is derived from concern for the other and relies on constructs that represent the evolving transaction between parent and child. 

CHILD PROTECTION
AND THE CONCEPTION OF PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITY

Introduction
The recognition that parental responsibility does not always result in adequate care for children has led to state intervention in the intimacy of the parent-child relationship in the form of child protection, at times without parental consent. The state's imposed intervention constitutes an extreme pole in the constant swing of the pendulum between parents and society concerning the question of whom does childhood belong to (Shamgar-Handelman, 1994). Herein lies the conflict that is conventionally (Shifman, 1989) formulated as parental rights vs. the child’s interests. It is the court that resolves this conflict and determines whether society takes over parental responsibility and limits and\or abrogates parental rights. 

The intervention of the state in the privacy of family relationships has been described as  a junction between “normalization” and “moralization” (Donzelot, 1979). It is the junction between society’s intent to reshape undesirable behaviors to conform to certain norms and the effort to maintain a desirable image of social phenomena as consonant with a particular moral stance. This paper describes a paradigm reflecting this junction, which relies on the epistemology of normality as a basis for assessing the parent-child relationship. This assessment, in turn, is guided by the ontology of moral judgment as a response to parental failure. The application of laws based on assumptions of normality and moral judgment to the issue of child protection allows normality to turn into normalization and moral judgment into moralization. This paradigm focuses on the condemnation\acquittal of the failing parent more than on protecting the child. 
 Two studies serve to illustrate this paradigm: one demonstrates that condemning the parent overshadows the child’s best interests; the other shows that focusing on acquitting the parent does not guarantee the protection of the child. A different view, derived from the definition of morality in terms of the concern for the other, may better focus on the child’s need for protection. This moral philosophy yields constructs that provide understanding of the nature of the evolving transactions between parents and children. The search for a solution to the child’s predicament is at the heart of this view. 

Description of the studies illustrating the junction between normalization and moralization precedes the explication of the paradigm. The paper concludes with a presentation of an alternative conception.


Description of the Studies
Design of the Studies
Two separate studies examined texts taken from the legal discourse on child protection. One study was conducted in Israel (Barkai & Mass, 1998) where the adversarial system that is borrowed from the English Method of Judgment is practiced, the other in Holland (van Nijnatten, Boesveldt, Schilperood & Mass, 2001) where the judicial process allies itself with the European Method of Judgment, hence the inquisitorial method. The original intention was to compare the conception of parental responsibility in two different legal systems.
 
The Israeli study examined the conception of parental responsibility found in all  published Supreme Court’s decisions from 1981 to 1988 regarding non-consensual adoption of minors. The Supreme Court functions as a court of appeal. The children's ages ranged from one to nine years, and among them were sets of two and three siblings. Of the twenty-four decisions examined, confidential adoption was ruled in twenty-two cases. In two cases, the court decided that parental rights were to be maintained and the child would be raised at home. 

To examine the findings of the Israeli study in terms of the judicial system, a comparison with legal texts from the inquisitorial method was required and the authors launched a study in The Netherlands. However, the decisions of the Dutch Supreme Court did not contain narratives that lent themselves to an examination of the construction of parental responsibility. The study, therefore, examined reports of the Child Welfare Protection (hence, CWP) Board, the authorized agency that provides preliminary information to the first level court. The data consisted of all of the twenty one CWP reports, from a randomly selected middle-sized region that were written between April and November of 1998 and recommended a family supervision order and out-of home placement. The children were between twelve- and fifteen years old. 

Due to a number of differences between the two sets of texts we could not compare these two studies in terms of the respective legal systems, as was originally intended. There is a gap of ten years between the texts that were examined, as the Israeli texts were written from 1981 to1988 and the Dutch texts in 1998. Each set of texts was taken from a different level of the legal discourse: the Israeli texts consisted of decisions made by the Supreme Court in its capacity as an appeal court, while the Dutch texts consisted of CWP reports presented to the first level court. The children in each set of texts were of a different age range, one- to nine years old in the Israeli texts and twelve- to fifteen years old in the Dutch texts.

Nonetheless, both studies fostered the view that the court’s decision is determined not by the facts themselves but rather by the “story” within which the facts are constructed (Scheppele, 1989), and employed the same methodology to deconstruct parental responsibility. The findings of both sets of texts reflect the junction between normalization and moralization, albeit each set of texts presents a different pattern of this junction. Comparing these two patterns elucidates the conception of parental responsibility that underlies the normalization/moralization paradigm. To explicate the conception of parental responsibility and its implications for the resolution of the child’s predicament, these studies are presented and discussed jointly, despite the above-mentioned differences. 

Methodology
Both studies employed a methodology allowing for the extrapolation of connections that construct the reported events into a story (Bennet & Feldman, 1981), in order to bring the conception of parental responsibility to the fore. Two types of connections were extrapolated: a. connections that qualify and define the reported events in terms of  empirical findings and social norms as well as by the logical sequence in which the events are reported; b. connections that evoke certain emotions and attitudes through the use of aesthetic and linguistic means.  

Connections that qualify and define the reported events:
Empirical connections assume the authority of knowledge and are above contradiction by laymen, including the court. “The prospects of this mother to acquire adequate parental skills are contingent on her willingness to get professional help”. Maternal skills are presented as the domain of expertise. 
Normative connections present the facts in terms of social conventions. “A difficult future can be anticipated for a natural mother who lives by herself with her son who was born out of wedlock”. Defining the mother’s situation as deviant serves the assessment that she is incapable. 
Logical connections anchor the facts in a sequence that conveys the weight ascribed to reported events. For example, in assessing parents’ co-operation, parental consent is preceded by descriptions of strong parental resistance. The sequence of the report logically grants the consent of the parents extra credence. (This connection was employed only by the Dutch study where the data were based on direct observations; the Israeli texts reviewed information that had been presented to the lower court).

Connections that evoke certain emotions and attitudes:
Aesthetic connections portray the events so as to arouse certain feelings. “The physical appearance of the mother (who has cerebral palsy) is bizarre, her mouth is wide open, her palate is high and her front teeth are missing”. Such a description, which by itself does not bear on mothering, evokes in the reader an aversive reaction toward the mother who is thereby perceived as  “an outsider” (Scheppele, 1989).
Linguistic connections categorize people. By the use of particular words, persons are implicitly classified as belonging to a certain type or as representing a stereotype: “The father did not bother to visit his son for three years”. While not visiting one’s son for three years is a gross omission of parental responsibility, and according to Israeli law serves as sufficient grounds for abrogating parental rights (The Law of Adoption, 1981), the use of the word “bother” categorizes the father as intentionally neglectful.

By exposing the empirical and the normative qualifications as well as the logical sequence of the reports, it was possible to deconstruct explanations of the parent-child relationship. The meanings that are evoked by the aesthetic and the linguistic connections disclosed the moral conception of parental responsibility.


Epistemology of the Parent-Child Relationship: 
Normality and Normalization
Explanations derived from the idea of normality were converted into normalization as the corollary of their alliance with the respective legal systems and their construction of child protection. 

Alliance between the Legal System and Knowledge
In matters of child protection, the court relies on behavioral science assumptions about the parent-child relationship. This reliance apparently stems from the idea that parental responsibility is natural to parenthood (Ekelaar, 1993, p.60). Thus, the explanation for its aberration is sought in the study of human nature. Three models represent the relevant epistemological approaches to child development: the main-effect model, the interactional model and the transactional model (Sameroff & Chandler, 1975). 

The main-effect model reflects the nature-nurture debate, and offers a causal explanation. One factor determines the development of the child, either the child’s congenital endowment or an environmental factor, with parental care first and foremost among these. This model conceives of continuity as constancy (Rutter, 1984), thereby fulfilling the requisite of knowledge – prediction. 
The interactional model also distinguishes between the child’s endowment and environmental effects. It differs from the main effect model in that it attributes the child’s development to the interaction between multiple factors and offers a descriptive explanation. Within this model, patterns of behavior constitute continuity (Rutter, 1984). 

The explanations provided by both of these models adhere to the conception of normality. Knowledge about the effects of certain factors explains the deviation of particular cases from the normal course of the parent-child relationship. 
The transactional model differs from the main-effect and interactional models in two respects. It posits that the transactional nature of child development changes the nature of the child and of the environment. Therefore, no distinction can be made between the child’s effect on the relationship and the parent’s. It explains the parent-child relationship by gaining understanding of experiences and meanings that shape the parent-child relationship, and therefore does not adhere to the idea of normality. This model conceives of continuity in terms of patterns of relationship (Rutter, 1984). 

The empirical evidence for any of these models is not conclusive. Therefore, the choice of a model is not determined by its validity. Examination of the texts indicated that the choice of a particular model was determined by its congruency with the nature of the legal system.  

Alliance between an Adversarial Process and the Main-Effect Model 
The judicial process in Israel follows the tradition of the adversarial system whereby the court functions as an arbitrator between two sides, which in child protection cases are the state vs. the parents. Two constructs serve the court in its decision: “parental capability” and “the best interest of the child”. When the court assesses parents as incapable, their rights are abrogated and confidential adoption, whereby contact between the child and the parent is completely severed, is conceived of as serving the child’s best interest (The Law of Adoption, 1981). 

The Israeli texts followed the main-effect model. The court conceived of the child’s development as determined by parental capability, which was constructed as synonymous with the parent’s personality. However, the normative connections indicated that the court’s assessment of parents as incapable is linked more closely to the parent’s deviance than to his or her pathology (Parton, 1979). Single motherhood, having a child out of wedlock and criminal records of older children were all defined as deviant and were ascribed to parental personality. In line with empirical connections, the texts repeatedly referred to professional intervention as a way to improve parental capability and attributed failure of such interventions to lack of co-operation by the parent. Nowhere was the failure to use help ascribed to the inadequacy of the professional help offered. For instance, the portrayal of parents who missed allotted visits with their children who had been placed out of the home ignored the difficult conditions often set by social agencies for parental visits (Hess, 1988). The equation of parental failure with the parent’s personality was reflected in the texts also by the omission of the effects of economic deprivation on the adequacy of the care provided by parents. 

The use of a causal explanation in the form of the main-effect model is consonant with the adversarial process whereby the use of “evidence” that qualifies the child's need to be protected by the state is dominant (Cooper, Hetherington, Baitow, Pitts & Spriggs, 1995). Once a cause has been detected reported events are constructed as evidence. The intent is to eradicate the deleterious effects of the cause, the cause, i.e., the parent must be removed. Indeed, Israeli law excludes incapable parents from the lives of their children by proclaiming the children “free for confidential adoption”. Such an irreversible decision warrants the kind of prediction that equates parental conduct with the constancy of parental personality. Furthermore, viewing parental personality and parental capability as synonymous leads to an “all or nothing” approach and inevitably links parental incapability to the complete severance of the child’s contact with the parent.
 
As noted earlier, two of the twenty-four examined decisions did not declare the children free for adoption. The court assessed the parents as capable and the children were to be raised at home. These decisions refrained from ascribing the child’s predicament to the parent’s personality. The court portrayed a reported beating of the child by the parent as a “mishap”, at the same time that it overlooked the fact that the parents did not visit the child when she was hospitalized. The decisions that the children would be raised at home by their parents served as a “mirror image” of the equation of parental capability with parental personality, rather than as an exception. The focus on the personality of the parent inevitably led the court to construct parental capability in global terms. Therefore, the solution to the child’s predicament was dichotomous, i.e., either the parent was to raise the child at home or the child’s contact with the parent was severed.

Alliance between an Inquisitorial Process and the Interactional Model 
The Dutch judicial process, which belongs to the inquisitorial school, follows a welfare model in which the court actively seeks and considers different positions.  In the Netherlands, the concept of “parental authority” refers to the quality of parental conduct, and is central to the discourse regarding state intervention in the parent-child relationship. When social services observe poor parental conduct and help offered on a voluntary basis fails, a request is served to the court by the CWP Board that “a family supervision order” will be issued (Dutch Civil Code, 1995). It is a time-limited order during which parental authority is placed under the supervision of a designated agency, with the expectation that improvement will be forthcoming. This is in line with the overall intention to prevent, to the greatest extent possible, the abrogation of parental rights (Jonkers & van Nijnatten, 1997). While the court may abrogate parental rights when a family supervision order fails, at no point are contacts between parents and children severed. 

Every account of the CWP worker began with the statement that the report was “a description of observations made at that particular point”, i.e., it was based on a view that conceived of the parent-child relationship as dynamic. Examination of the explanations used in the texts indicated that they employed an interactional model, which was descriptive and allowed for different patterns of interaction. The data described three different patterns of parenting: good parents with unmanageable children, disturbed parent-child relationships and poor parenting.
1. Good parents with unmanageable children (eight cases). Parents were willing people who had tried everything to solve their children's difficult problems. To qualify the severity of the children’s difficulties, the texts defined these problems in psychological\psychiatric terms, by use of empirical connections. Five of these stories presented a continuous co-operative parental attitude and three cases described an obvious change in parental attitude, from an earlier resistance to co-operation. 
2. Disturbed parent child relationships (ten cases). Both the children and the parents were problematic. The children were difficult and exhibited serious personality problems while the parents were deficient in their parenting. However the parents’ biographies portrayed patterns of change; the parents’ deviance was located in the past while the present situation was indicative of a change for the better. It was the ability to change that was presented in these stories as continuous and as a promise for better parenting in the future.
3. Poor parental care (three cases). Because of mental disabilities these parents’ lives were at odds with raising their children. They resisted the help offered to them; these stories indicated no prospect for improvement. 

As noted earlier all the reports selected recommended a family supervision order. The employment of the interactional model allowed for the inclusion of the parents in their children’s lives in congruence with the intent of Dutch Law. It also reflected the key construct of the inquisitorial approach, which is “care” (Cooper, Hetherington, Baitow, Pitts & Spriggs, 1995). 

Both sets of texts, the Israeli and the Dutch, relied on assumptions of normality. However, as neither the main-effect nor the interactional model has gained validity, the choice of a model appears to be determined by its congruency with the respective legal system. Thus, rather than providing a basis for assessing normality, explanations of parent-child relationships were placed at the service of normalization, i.e., the application of empirical findings and theoretical thinking for standardizing the parent-child relationship. 


 Construction of the Parent-Child Relationship
The use of the idea of normality in assessing parental capability follows the tradition that equates knowledge with observable properties (Harre’, 1981). The parent-child relationship, seen through this lens, is reflected in the physical separateness of parent and child. The corollary is that the parent’s effect on the child is conceived of as separate from that of the child’s effect on the parent. The models that were employed by both sets of texts depicted this conception. Examination of the empirical connections revealed that this division informed the inevitable child-protection decision as to who needed to be protected. 

Focusing on the parental effect in the Israeli texts
The Israeli texts uniformly defined the parent as the cause of the child's predicament. Since a causal explanation was sought, the portrayal of the parent as incapable and deviant explained the state of the child. The texts did not specify the link between the parent’s unfit personality and the harm he or she inflicted on the child. In line with the deterministic nature of causal explanations, the texts left the specific harm to be inferred from the categorization of the parent as deviant. Furthermore, in accordance with the conception that early experience determines the child’s psychological structure (Clark & Clark, 1976), harm inflicted on the child was presented as irreversible. The corollary was that the best interest of the child rests with the severance of contact with the parent, in the form of confidential adoption. Nowhere did the texts refer to the child’s view of his or her contact with the parent. Neither did the texts mention the possible effect of the separation of siblings, which is part and parcel of confidential adoption. 

The court’s decisions implied that the best interest of the child rests with excluding the biological family from the child’s life, since the expected tie with the adoptive parents would replace all former contacts. The construct of the “psychological parent” supported this stance (Goldstein, Freud & Solnit, 1973), despite critical review of its inconsistency and lack of empirical evidence for the assumptions upon which it was based (Katkin, Bullingham & Levine, 1978). This construct served the idea that it is not the biological tie with the parent, but rather the psychological effect engendered by parental care that is critical for the child’s well being.
 
Clearly, the unidirectional view that defined parental personality as the cause of the child's predicament placed the child in the protected position, very much in line with the objective of child protection. However, the emphasis on the parent’s effect on the child focused legal attention on parental failure, while the child, as a subject, was not present. The child was depicted only as the object of both parental failure and state intervention. The absence of the child as a subject was noticeable also in the two decisions where the parents, who were not assessed as incapable, were permitted to raise the child at home. While these decisions did not present parents as endangering the child, some deficits in parental care were noted. But texts did not make any reference to the children’s responses to these deficits. 

By focusing only on the parent’s effects on the child the Israeli texts adhered to a standard of assessment that was not derived from the actual relationship between the 

parent and the child. It is, therefore, not clear whether the solution determined by the court would serve the protection of the child.   

Focusing on either the parental or the child’s effect in the Dutch texts
The interactional model that characterized the Dutch texts allowed for a reciprocal view of the parent’s and the child's effects on each other. Nonetheless, examination of the empirical and normative connections revealed a unidirectional conception, albeit not a uniform one.

As noted earlier, the texts described three different patterns of parenting. The first was a pattern of parents whose conduct had failed because of the difficulties caused by the children. These difficulties were empirically qualified by the use of psychiatric\psychological terminology indicating that the children’s problems stemmed from their personal inner structure. It was, therefore, the child who affected the parent while parental failure was a reaction to the child’s problems. The same view was discerned in the second pattern, which described both parents and children as problematic. Empirical terms constructed the children’s difficulties as expressions of their personal difficulties, while normative connections presented the parents’ difficulties as inappropriate responses to circumstantial adversities. These latter difficulties were more amenable to change, as was evidenced by the way the logical connections were employed. Parental biographies portrayed series of continuous changes with problematic behaviors set in the past and indications of improvement emerging later. Much as in the first group, it was the children problems that affected parental care. In depiction of both groups of parents it was the parent who needed support, contrary to the convention that it is the child who should be protected. (Solnit, 1984). The conventional view was present in descriptions of the third group, where empirical connections depicted parents as 

suffering from severe mental pathologies that left the children grossly neglected and in need of protection. 

The interactional model allowed for a reciprocal view, but the construction of the parent-child relationship in the Dutch texts set up a unidirectional narrative whereby either the child or the parent requires protection. Either position framed the child as an object and not as a subject. The texts catalogued the children’s difficult behaviors but even when, in accordance with the interactional model, a voice was given to these adolescent children, their words were ignored. The explication of the logical connections revealed that children’s reports of parental abuse were followed by parental responses of regret or denial, thereby constructing a sequence that either blurred parental misconduct or insinuated that the report was unreliable. Moreover, the severity of the neglect of  children by mentally handicapped parents, who resisted any help, was totally ignored by leaving parental rights intact. . 






Normality and Normalization 
The all too common notion that parental responsibility is natural to parents introduces “normality” into the assessment of parental failure. This view does not consider the variability of social-cultural contexts that imbues parental responsibility with different meanings. Furthermore, although this view is represented by the term “maternal instinct”, the evolutionary perspective most akin to instinctually based explanations does not support it. The evolutionary perspective views parenting as the resolution of a conflict between the infant’s demands on the one hand and the parent’s need to preserve his (or her) resources on the other (Parmigiani & vom Saal, 1994). According to this view, parental responsibility is not natural. Therefore the attempt to use normality as a basis for determining the state’s imposition on parental responsibility is doomed to turn into normalization. 

Normalization does not require the consideration of the child’s view. It is measured by societal norms. This is one possible explanation of the finding that, despite the differences in the legal systems from which they were derived and the different models of explanation, both the Israeli and the Dutch texts ignored the child’s subjectivity. 


The Ontology of Moral Judgment in the Service of Moralization  
The ever-growing call on the state to intervene to protect children may serve as an indication that the parent-child relationship is, as the evolutionary perspective professes, inherently laden with conflict. Parental responsibility is therefore inherently moral, as is any other form of responsibility. This claim may gain support from the findings presented in the previous section, where explanations derived from the notion of normality, and hence devoid of a moral stance, failed to represent the child. Further, as the following presentation indicates, a moral conception in assessing parental responsibility can not be avoided. Examination of the decisions and recommendations specified in the texts and the explication of aesthetic and linguistic connections demonstrated that both sets of texts were guided inadvertently by a moral conception, albeit not one appropriate to child protection. 

Condemning parents in the Israeli texts
Two solutions were offered by the Israeli texts: severance of contact between children and their parents for parents who were assessed as “incapable”, and raising children at home for parents deemed “capable”. This dichotomy reflected the traditional role of the judicial penalty  ” ….by bringing into play the binary opposition of the permitted and the forbidden…by operating the division, acquired once and for all, of condemnation” (Foucault, 1977, p. 183).

The meanings delineated by the examination of aesthetic and linguistic connections supported this observation. The court ascribed parental failure to the parent’s harmful intentions. On the one hand “the parent does not bother to visit the child” and on the other, the parent’s motivation in struggling to maintain parental rights was described as self-serving. For example, a mother who was described as having an immature personality and as limited in her ability to raise her children requested that her children be placed in a foster family.  She wanted them to grow in a nurturing environment and she also wanted to maintain contact with them. The court presented this request as “motivated by her wish to raise them at the public’s expense”. 

The court’s presentation of parents’ reports and those of their lawyers insinuated that they lack credibility and commonly opened with, “they claim to….”. The portrayals of parents and their life styles evoked aversive reactions toward the parents. Parental capability was defined as a global construct in which the parent was presented not only as a deficient parent of the particular child in question, but as a bad person, e.g., “the parent has two older sons who have criminal records”.  Indeed, the characterizing of parental personality as deviant rather than as pathological, as noted earlier, allowed equating the assessed parental incapability with blame (Parton, 1979).

This equation was incongruent with the court’s self-proclaimed aims. The texts repeatedly stated that the court was not concerned with either accusing the parent or with looking into the parent’s intentions, but rather with the best interests of the child, in accordance with the characterization of the Law of the Adoption of Minors as a private law. “Intentions” are a critical component in condemning a defendant in criminal law cases. The employment of causal explanations, which serves the requirement of the adversarial system for evidence, might have accounted for the affinity of these texts with criminal law. In the absence of a validated empirical base for the main-effect model, the distinction between “blame” and “a cause” was easily blurred. 

The examination of the meanings ascribed to “the best interests of the child” further corroborated the observation that these texts echoed criminal law categories. While the texts inferred that the best interests of the child demanded severance from parents by equating parental incapability with the parent’s evil intentions, adoptive parents, in the abstract, were described in idealistic terms. Declaring the children free for confidential adoption is an obvious consequence.

A statement describing how difficult it had been for the judges to arrive at a decision abrogating parental rights, a connection that presented this solution as inevitable, often accompanied this conclusion. Yet, the decision did not specify any considerations concerning the effect on the child of severing his or her contact with the parent. An example was a case in which the mother’s inconsistency in visiting her son, whom she could not raise at home, overshadowed the boy’s reported joy at her visits and elation when returning from her home. The decision to free the child for confidential adoption was not accompanied by any mention of the effect of the complete severance of this connection on the boy.

It appears that it was the parental offence against societal norms that determined the court’s definition of the best interests of the child.  

Acquitting parents in the Dutch texts
The Dutch texts used the interactional model in which the child’s development was conceived of as affected by multiple factors that diffused causality. The avoidance of causal attribution might have accounted for the uniform recommendation made for all three groups of parenting described in the texts, including the first and third groups, which represented extreme poles. In the first group, problems were depicted as resulting from children’s difficult behaviors, and parents were described as caring and willing to be helped. For example: “The disturbances of John are too complex for ambulatory assistance,” while the parents were described as having raised three other children successfully, as co-operative with the social worker and as hoping that ‘John will get the help he should have”. In the third group, the parent’s pathology was understood as endangering the children, and the parents as resisting help. For example, “the mother was taking prescribed medication following her release from the hospital; after a short while, she refused to take the medication and, as a result, things got worse. Jim was often on his own at home, went to school independently and found his mother asleep when he returned”. 

The imposition of the same level of state intervention on caring parents and on parents who endangered their children might have expressed the CWP workers’ attempts to engage parents in a family supervision order. This leveling, however, also indicated the need to neutralize the insinuation of condemnation commonly associated with “responsibility”. The reports on these two extreme groups resembled accounts presented by the defense in a criminal court, where the defendant can be acquitted on one of two conditions: if he had no choice but to act as he did, or if he was not liable “for reasons of insanity”. In the first group, the texts presented parental conduct as having been determined by the children’s difficulties, and in the third group, the parents’ severe mental disorders served to explain their failure. 

The observers’ attempt to exempt parents from responsibility was also notable for the second group, where both parents and children constituted the problem. Deconstruction of the evocative connections showed that the passive form was used in reporting undesirable parental conduct, which was presented as just having “happened”. Parents were depicted as helpless in their parenting, in contrast to their portrayal as able to overcome great difficulties in their lives, where the active form was applied. 









The conception of parental responsibility in terms of condemnation\acquittal, equated protection of the child with society’s response to the parent. The Israeli texts connoted  punishment inflicted on parents by severing their contacts with their children, despite the declared intention of the law. The Dutch texts granted absolution to parents by exercising benign control over them. 

In the absence of a different conception, the convention that links responsibility with moral judgment filled the void created by the inadequate application of the idea of normality to parental responsibility. The conception of moral judgment and the idea of normality both imply standardized measures. The imposition of these standards on parental responsibility inevitably turned morality into moralization, where it was the image of parenthood that needed protection rather than the child. This stance inevitably positioned the child as an object in both sets of texts. Paradoxically, the child as a subject was absent twice over from these texts that deliberate on his or her protection. 


An Alternative View: Concern for the Other
The child’s position as an object is intrinsic to the normalization\moralization paradigm. This paradigm blocks our understanding of the child’s often specific predicament, and is incongruent with the aim of the judicial process to protect the child rather than societal 

morale. To place the child in the rightful position, as a subject in the process intended to protect him, a different paradigm must be applied. 

An alternative moral philosophy that conceives of concern for the other as moral can better serve the conception of parental responsibility. It is derived from the idea that the vulnerability of the other is embodied by the “nudity” of his “defenseless eyes”, and thereby commands one’s responsibility (Levinas, 1982\1996). Within this conception, parental responsibility is determined by the parent’s response to the child’s vulnerability. 
The current conception of infant development complements this view. The infant’s gaze serves as a force that engages the parent’s protection and care, from the very moment of birth (Bowlby, 1969).  As the infant’s abilities develop, his repertoire of engaging behaviors expands and becomes ever more complex. Within this model, the core of parenting remains the evolving transaction between the child's calling and the parent’s response that, in turn, affects the child’s calling. 

This parallel shift, to a moral philosophy of concern for the other and to the transactional model of explanation, is represented by the responsiveness to the gaze both as an interpersonal experience and as a metaphor. The child’s gaze represents at one and the same time his vulnerability, which commands parental responsibility, and his ability to engage parental care (Roskies, 1972). Understanding the child’s experience of being protected and cared for is as essential within this conception of parental responsibility as understanding the parent’s responsiveness to the child’s call (Mass, 1994; Mass, 1996). 

This paradigm focuses on finding a solution for the child rather than on society’s response to parental failure. Such a stance positions the judicial process not as an authority that renders judgment but as a concerned agency. It is not only the responsiveness of the parent to the child’s vulnerability that constitutes responsibility, but also the response of the court. The moral philosophy of concern for the other offers a definition of morality in terms of the prevention of unnecessary suffering and loss (Ophir, 2000), which is consistent with the aim of the judicial process to protect the child. 

An example from a more recent Israeli legal discourse may clarify this view: A single new immigrant mother repeatedly placed her young daughter with acquaintances and friends while moving around in the hope for a secure existence. Finally, she left her three-year old daughter in the care of her chronically ill grandmother and disappeared. Several months later, when the sick grandmother’s condition worsened and she could no longer care for the child, she placed the child with protective services that managed to locate the mother after a considerable search. The adoption service then made a request to free the child for confidential adoption. At that time the daughter was placed in the custody of the state and met with her mother regularly. In spite of the mother’s adherence to the visitation regime, the expert who was appointed by the court submitted the testimony that the mother did not comprehend the effects of her earlier desertions on her daughter, nor was she aware of her unique significance for her daughter. The expert agreed with the adoption service’s view that there was no prospect of the mother structuring her life in accordance with her daughter’s needs, and therefore she should not regain custody of her daughter. At the same time, the expert witness submitted the observation that this mother’s former disappearance had been experienced by the child as a loss (Ophir, 2000). Thus, although placing the child with adoptive parents would provide her the necessary nurturing environment, it would not replace the significance of her contact with her mother. The expert stated that the state must not replicate the mother’s desertion by severing the girl's contact with her mother, and therefore any solution decreed by the court should allow contact to continue. This argument was based on the expert’s assessment of the child’s responses to the mother’s reappearance in her life. The grandmother’s testimony served as additional support to this recommendation. Before the mother had been located, every telephone call between the grandmother and the girl had begun with the child’s question about the whereabouts of her mother; when the grandmother replied that she did not know, the child responded with silence and did not speak further. 

While the mother’s conduct is condemnable, the solution provided by the court should avoid any unnecessary loss for the child, such as that inherent in confidential adoption. It is the court’s response to the child’s vulnerability, no less than the mother’s, that is warranted by the paradigm guided by concern for the other. 
  
This way of understanding and assessing parental responsibility is not derived from the notion of normality. Nor does is it rely on moral judgment (Mass, 1999). Constructs that represent the significance of one person to another and are explicitly steeped in a moral view (Ophir, 2000), such as the aforementioned “disappearance” and “loss”, will provide the court with access to the nature of the parent-child transaction. By considering the individual child, the conception of morality as responsiveness to the other’s vulnerability can be actualized (Levinas, 1982\1996). 

The definition of parental responsibility in terms of responsiveness to the child may not be the only alternative to the conception that focuses on the parent’s condemnation\acquittal. It is presented not only because it is a viable alternative, but also 






between normalization and moralization, is rendered obsolete by this conception of parental responsibility. Child protection is all about weaving the child’s individuality into a responsive relationship. 
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